

RSC BRIEFING

25 June 1958

DOS REVIEW
COMPLETED

LEBANON

I. Political and military situations stalemated.

- A. Hammarskjold firmly opposed to bringing outside military forces into Lebanon—UN or otherwise.**
- B. His opinion stems from belief that adequate force from small countries could not be raised quickly.**
- C. He is convinced that he cannot stake UN's prestige and possible future effectiveness in the UN on Lebanon.**
- D. Despite his estimate of 5-6,000 infiltrators he believes rebellion largely internal matter.**

II. Rebel push in and on Beirut appears impending.

- A. Rebel concentrations in Basta Moslem quarter of Beirut are reported largest yet.**

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- B. Despite Hammarskjold's Cairo visit, UNAR continues its support of rebels.**

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- C. Kamal Jumblatt's Druze forces are infiltrating into and around Beirut in anticipation of big push.**

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III. Shihab continues his equivocal policy and is in contact with rebels.

A. He has made "deal" with Jumblatt giving Jumblatt free hand in areas dominated by Druze.

1. This arrangement not only insures Jumblatt's supply lines to Syria, but enables his forces to infiltrate into Beirut.

B. Camaraderie between Jumblatt forces and army troops prevails. Two forces conduct joint patrols along roads.

C. Shihab's attitude toward situation aptly illustrated when he was queried about his civilian attire recently. He replied that "it was Sunday."

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D. Shihab has promised Chamoun several times that he would start offensives against rebels, but does nothing more than producing "plans of action."

E. Rebel-held Basta continues to be lit by government-supplied electricity which is used to print out anti-government papers.

1. Government post office delivers telegrams and mail there

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F. Shihab told US ambassador that opposition would be willing to enter into "de facto" cease-fire until presidential election 24 July.

- 1. Opposition would continue its anti-Chamoun statements and probably renew fighting if president unacceptable to them elected.**
- 2. Shihab claims his men need a "week in which to wash up and change their boots and socks."**
- 3. Chamoun disturbed by Shihab's suggestion, regards it as possible "sell out" to Nasir and as legitimizing rebel movement.**
- 4. Also would allow EAR to continue pouring in support to rebels during truce.**

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
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VI. Hammarskjold reported much impressed by Nasir's "assurances"
(presumably of intent to end UAR interference).

A. Felt if Nasir could take trip to Yugoslavia, he couldn't
have too many plans for Lebanon.

1. Hammarskjold overly optimistic. Nasir was in Moscow when
UAR interference began.



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